An aerial view of the 1st Marine Division Main COC in Camp Matilda, Kuwait, Operation Iraq Freedom.
Credit: https://shorturl.at/BFCy3
This article aims to identify a glaring blind spot that the Marine Corps must fix as part of its drive for modernization: the survivability of tactical-level command operations centers (COC). Over the past several years, multiple force-on-force exercises have witnessed the effective targeting and destruction of tactical command posts in unscripted scenarios. Troublingly, these instances have yet to cause any significant service-wide changes in how we conduct COC operations.
To support these claims, the following paragraphs will highlight trends from four COC sacks and one COC struck by air. The names of exercises and units have been intentionally removed; marring or vindicating reputations is not the intent of this article. These specific cases represent multiple unmentioned examples that suggest a fleet-wide problem. This analysis aims to spawn a much-needed challenge to the status quo of how the Marine Corps conducts COC operations in the field, specifically in the physical setup and security of COCs.
All four COC sacks mentioned above were conducted by small, dismounted elements operating within the “secure” or “rear area” of the enemy regiment, battalion, or company. These small elements had a high payoff target list that looked something like this: fires assets, logistics, and command and control (C2) nodes. In one case, a battalion C2 node was identified through standard reconnaissance sweeps with a small unmanned aerial system (sUAS). Once identified, a dismounted element simply vectored to the position, and the unit leaders directed actions on the objective.
The three other cases are similar but unique. One involved a small, dismounted unit that directly observed an enemy C2 node stop and set up in what they thought was a secure area due to its significant distance from the forward line of troops (FLOT). Another involved a small, dismounted unit observing an odd-shaped camouflage netting through vegetation and coordinating with a battalion-level sUAS to confirm its identity as an adversary COC. The last example involved a small, dismounted unit vectoring itself onto a C2 node in the dark by moving silently towards the sound of an idling tactical vehicle and muffled conversation within the COC.
The instance of effective targeting by air involved an accurate intelligence estimate concerning where the adversary COC had displaced to. When the aircraft came on station, it searched for the COC and struck something whose size and shape could only have been a COC.
The Trends
1) Easily identifiable. In all cases, despite extensive use of cammie netting, the aggressors easily identified an enemy COC due to one or a combination of the following: accompanying vehicles, presence of various unhidden antennae, cumbersome shape/silhouette, excessively expansive footprint, lack of noise discipline, lack of light discipline, or the presence and posture of personnel in and around the COC. Even when the COC took a more expeditionary construct using Utility Task Vehicles, its general footprint still led observers to suspect they were looking at a COC.
2) Lack of established early warning or security outside the COC. In the cases above, COCs had little to no early warning to alert them to danger, either in the form of objects that produce visual or audio signatures or humans on security with enough stand-off to be effective.
3) Lack of preparedness within the COC. In all cases, those manning the COC were taken completely off guard and were not postured to respond effectively.
Recommendations
1) Avoid detectable silhouettes and patterns. One of the best ways to avoid detection from ground or air surveillance involves eliminating visually identifiable patterns and silhouettes. The “Iron Cross” and other standard COC setups are very efficient and military in appearance. Still, no amount of cammie netting will hide them from the attentive eye of a UAS operator who knows what to look for or a patrol leader hunting COCs. Even from the ground, nothing screams “COC” like a large, odd-shaped cammie net. COC locations need to be selected the way good patrol bases are – in the nastiest terrain available. Setting up in an area without overhead concealment from trees or brush is ideal for radio traffic but not survival. Antennas can be run up trees and boulders or out of a thicket but cannot be presented to the enemy in the open.
Another part of pattern avoidance involves minimizing foot and vehicle traffic outside the COC. The more traffic entering or exiting, the easier it is to pinpoint the COC. Moreover, with modern thermal optics, the heat signature left behind by a pedestrian can be identified and followed to the COC.
2) Disperse. The less concealment afforded by terrain, the more COCs need to rely on physical dispersion. For instance, the four wings of the Iron Cross need to achieve a level of dispersion that prevents a dismounted enemy from easily sweeping through and killing everyone at once. Dispersion should require multiple munitions to render the COC inoperable due to air or artillery strikes. Even in an area where the terrain provides concealment, COC elements should consider dispersing to increase survivability in case of attack from air, ground, or indirect fire (IDF).
Additionally, properly dispersed COCs enhance survivability during an attack and allow the dispersed elements to support the element under attack. For example, elements of a COC can provide mutual support in the form of Marines and their personal weapons. To facilitate this dispersion, “dumb” technology, such as field phones, should be considered. And with modern data-sharing technology, there is no reason C2 nodes cannot be efficient while dispersed.
3) Decrease size & increase mobility. Any intelligent enemy with a high payoff target list will look for anomalies. They will look for really big cammie netting and recognize it as a COC. COCs need to shrink to blend in with physical and man-made terrain. They can do this by dispersing their various elements and minimizing the amount and size of COC equipment. For example, tracking boards that do not fit into a main pack should be seriously scrutinized and left behind if unnecessary. Any superfluous gear, such as personal pelican cases, should be left in the assembly area or farther to the rear. Start with the minimum gear required for dismounted COC operations and resist the urge to add to it. The more gear, the bigger the footprint. The bigger the footprint, the harder to hide and the slower to move.
4) Establish early warning elements. COCs are notorious for not keeping their own dedicated security, yet they require a power source like a vehicle or generator to be fully functional. These power sources create a very distinct audio signature. At a minimum, COCs need to have early warning systems established just outside the audio signature of their noisiest assets. Ideally, early warning should include Marines on security or a combination of Marines and objects that produce an audio or visual signature. Gone are the days when a COC can assume itself secure simply because it sits behind the FLOT. In future conventional battles, adversaries will seek to employ small, dismounted elements behind the lines to identify and disrupt/destroy C2 nodes. Early warning devices should be standard equipment for COCs, and those manning the COC must use them.
5) Maintain security. Marines with rifles provide both excellent early warning and physical security. The COC needs to have enough rifles, medium machine guns, Carl Gustavs, and Stingers dedicated to physical security to make any would-be attacker pay for making the attempt. No one should easily walk into the cammie net, or approach the nearest piece of terrain, and start blazing away unchallenged.
6) Prepare for Contact. COC personnel must be as ready to fight as Marines are on security. Although no one would say it out loud, current popular thinking is that the enemy must make it through multiple units to affect the COC with direct-fire weapons. As already stated, gone are the days when the enemy cannot strike COCs by raids or fires. The Marine Corps should operate under the mentality that Field Marshal Viscount Slim insisted on among his COC elements in Burma: “There are no non-combatants.” All rear echelon elements must be prepared to provide their own security and possess the proficiency and physicality to stand a chance against an assault.[1] As mentioned earlier, the posture of the individuals observed around the COCs that were struck, either by ground or by air, added to their identification as COCs. It also added to their lack of survivability: They were relaxed and generally thought themselves safe. Personnel at COCs must be conditioned to think about their own security as much as Marines in a patrol base do.
7) Entrench. COCs that plan to remain in place for more than an hour need to have sufficient entrenchment to defend against ground attacks or to use as cover against IDF or air attacks. It is easier than ever to be spotted on the modern battlefield, so COCs should build entrenchment into their troop-to-task matrix as part of their battle drill for establishing the COC. If Marines on the line dig in after an extended stop due to the threat of IDF or air attack, so should the COC. This will also enable the COC to reduce its silhouette above ground.
8) Train and educate. To truly affect change, the Marine Corps needs to start making these practices and mindsets an expectation at Service-Level Exercises. Schoolhouses like Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Group need to make this part of the education for operations chiefs and operations officers. Entry-level officer training and advanced courses for enlisted Marines with combat arms or support specialties need to lay the foundation for these practices by introducing expectations early in developing a tactical sense. Conversely, the Marine Corps needs to move away from teaching or expecting prescriptive models of manicured physical COC configuration and instead teach a set of capabilities the COC must provide, regardless of how the COC is configured.
Again, this article does not wish to call out any particular unit or exercise. Rather, it seeks to highlight a blind spot across the operating forces in the current drive for modernization and spark the kind of adaptation that should result from nearly a decade of emphasis on free-play force-on-force exercises. If Marines are determined enough to strike COCs in training, a determined enemy will certainly strike them in future wars. As the well-known adage goes, “In combat, Marines rise to their level of training.” To maintain the current standard for COCs is an invitation for calamity.
Author Bio: Major Burchfield is an infantry officer serving as the Inspector-Instructor for Lima Company, 3rd Battalion, 23rd Marine Regiment in Montgomery, Alabama. The highlights of his career include two Middle East deployments, one deployment to Okinawa, and a tour as a Warfighting Instructor at The Basic School.
[1] Defeat Into Victory, Field Marshal Viscount Slim, chapter 7, page 195. This section of the book and others provide a mentality that starkly contrasts with current popular thought about the capabilities of “rear echelon” elements within our formations. I highly recommend this reading, especially when considering training for modern/future war.
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